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1962 AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
PAUL D. BARNS* AND TAYLOR MATTIS**
INTRODUCTION
The amendments and revisions to the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, which were effective July 1, 1962,' represent an effort to
keep court procedure in step with the times. This article is a discussion
of some of the technical hobbles which necessitated the amendments.
More important, it is an attempt to inform the practicing attorney of
the import of the amendments and how the courts may be expected to
rule under them. The sweeping suggestion in the last civil procedure
article published in the University of Miami Law Review2 was to
READ THE RULES; the reader of this article is admonished to read
and compare the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' It will be readily noted that the Florida
rules are patterned after the federal rules. Therefore, "decisions of the
federal courts construing their rule are pertinent,"4 as are commentaries
relating to federal rules which have a Florida counterpart.
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted the revisions and compila-
tion of the Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to the power vested in it
by article V of the state constitution.5 The "new rules" supersede all
conflicting rules and statutes.6
• Justice of Florida Supreme Court (retired).
** Editorial Board Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962).
2. Massey, Civil Procedure, Fifth Survey of Florida Law, Part Two, 16 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 591 (1962).
3. These rules will often be referred to hereinafter as the "Florida rules" or as the
"federal rules" respectively.
4. Savage v. Rowell Distrib. Corp., 95 So.2d 415, 417 (Fla. 1957); Brown v. Ripley,
119 So.2d 712, 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). In Cassel v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 143 So.2d 510, 514
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), the court pointed out: "Rule 13(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . .. is substantially the same as the present Florida Rule 1.13(7) . . . and
the same amendment as discussed above in regard to the Florida Rule was added to the
Federal Rule in 1946. . . . It, therefore, seems logical and reasonable to assume that the
Florida Supreme Court amended Florida Rule 1.13(7) for the same reasons as those stated
in Moore. . . ." The "Committee Note of 1946 to amend subdivision (g) of Federal Rule
13" also influenced the Florida court's interpretation of the Florida rule. Ibid.
5. "The practice and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by
the supreme court." FLA. CONSr. art. V, § 3. As a general proposition there are three power
sources enabling the judiciary to regulate practice and procedure: inherent power, statutory
enabling acts and constitutional authority. Mr. Justice Terrell, speaking for the Florida
Supreme Court in Petition of Florida Bar Ass'n for the Adoption of Rules for Practice &
Procedure, 155 Fla. 710, 713, 21 So.2d 605, 607 (1945), said that "this Court has approached
the rule making power in a pragmatic way and has not become involved in the niceties
of such concepts as inherent power to make rules or the delegation of the rule making
power."
For a scholarly discussion of the power of the judiciary to regulate practice and pro-
cedure, see Nash, Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REv. 24, 39 (1961).
6. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962). FLA. STAT. § 25.371
276
FLORIDA RULES
The outline of the amendments and discussion is as follows:
I. RULE 1.7. PLEADINGS: MOTIONS
(a) Pleadings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(e) Motion in Lieu of Scire Facias . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. RULE 1.20. CONSOLIDATION: SEPARATE TRIALS ..........
III. RULE 1.32. WITNESSES, EXPERT, DEPOSITIONS ..........
IV. RULE 1.35. DISMISSAL OF AcTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Introduction to the Problem of Termination oj Actions in Florida
2. Analysis of Rule 1.35 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof . . . . . . . . . .
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) By Order of Court; If Counterclaim . . . . . . . .
(b) Involuntary Dismissal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Status of Non-Suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. RULE 1.38. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, DECREES OR ORDERS .. .......
(a) Clerical Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evi-
dence; Fraud, etc ....... .................
1. Analysis of Rule 1.38(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Timeliness of Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Independent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Essentials and Effect of Motion .... ...........
5. Appeals under Rule 1.38(b) . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. RULE 2.8. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIALS; REHEARING; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENTS
(a) Jury and Non-Jury Cases ..... ..............
(b) Time for Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Time for Serving Affidavits . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(d) On Initiative of Court ...... ...............
(e) When Motion for Unnecessary; Non-Jury Case .. .......
(f) Order Granting to Specify Grounds .... ...........
(g) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment .........
VII. RULE 3.13. INTERPLEADER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .











I. RULE 1.7. PLEADINGS: MOTIONS
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer;
and there shall be a reply to a counterclaim denominated as
such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a
cross-claim. No other pleadings shall be allowed, except that
the court may order a reply to an answer.
The major import of the new rule 1.7(a) is contained in the
phrase "denominated as such."7 In setting forth what pleadings are
allowed, the former rule stated that: "there shall be a reply if the
answer contains a counterclaim"; the words "denominated as such"
(1961) provides: "When a rule is adopted by the supreme court concerning practice and
procedure, and such rule conflicts with a statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision."
Granting that a rule takes precedence over a statute when they conflict regarding a
certain practice or procedure, the. determination of when there is a conflict isp sometimes
difficult. A Florida statutory provision requiring that all statutes repealed or superseded
by court rules be expressly designated would seem to ameliorate the difficulty. Fla. Laws
1943, ch. 21995, § 4, at 689, contained that provision, but the statute was repealed.
7. The amended rule closely followed the words of federal rule 7(a) as it read before
the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The amendment of federal
7(a) does not affect the substance of the rule Florida has adopted.
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were omitted. The new rule makes a reply mandatory without court
order only if the counterclaim is denominated as such. If no reply is
entered in response to a counterclaim denominated as such, or in response
to a court order8 to reply, a default or decree pro confesso is in order.
The difficulty of drawing a clear-cut distinction between a counterclaim
and certain affirmative defenses makes the provision as to denomination
helpful. A plaintiff should not be subjected to the perilous task of
correctly analyzing the matter set forth in the answer to determine
whether he must reply.9
Note the following situations: (1) If new matter in an answer is
really a counterclaim, but is not so denominated, the plaintiff need not
reply;' ° (2) If an answer contains affirmative defensive matter not
entitling a defendant to relief, but denominated as a counterclaim, the
plaintiff is not thereby required to reply." In short, a reply is mandatory
only for a true counterclaim, which is denominated as a counterclaim.
Rule 1.8(d) might be utilized in either of the above situations. It
provides: "When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if
justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper
designation." Thus, in situation one the court might order a reply and
in situation two the court would probably treat the mislabeled material
as merely defensive. In either case, the plaintiff no longer faces the
alternatives of replying or risking default when he is uncertain whether
an answer contains a counterclaim.
When, as in situation one, a counterclaim is not "denominated as
such," and no reply is required by the court, the party adverse to the
counterclaim may offer evidence at trial in denial or avoidance of the
counterclaim. 2
The last sentence of rule 1.7(a) provides "that the court may order
a reply to an answer." In some situations a motion by the defendant to
require a reply to the answer might be advisable. In actions at law, when
8. In Dickerson v. Orange State Oil Co., 123 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960), the court
made a distinction between a court order to reply and an "authorization" by the court to
reply. See Massey, supra note 2, at 605.
9. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 7.03, at 1534 (2d ed. 1962). For difficulties caused
by the lack of distinction between counterclaims and equitable defenses, especially as to
the form of trial, see Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922);
Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A.O. Anderson & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381 (1925)
(Cardozo, J.).
10. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fI 7.03, at 1534 (2d ed. 1962).
11. Rule 1.7(a) requires a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such. In hypothet
number two, the answer does not contain a counterclaim. A cow which is branded "horse"
is still a cow!
12. Rule 1.8(e) provides that "averments in a pleading to which no responsive plead-
ing is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided." The term "averments"
means affirmative matter; a denial is not an averment of anything.
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the answer sets up an affirmative defense rather than a denial, a reply
would more clearly ascertain the issues before trial and thereby avoid
uncertainty.13 Of course, a reply to an answer setting up an affirmative
defense may either be in denial or avoidance.
The scope of the term "pleading," as used in the rules, is clarified
by the new 1.7. The meaning of "pleadings" does not include motions. 4
Formerly, it was often said, "A motion is a pleading, but not a responsive
pleading." Now the title of 1.7 is "Pleadings; Motions," indicating that
the two are distinct.
(e) Motion in Lieu of Scire Facias. Any relief available by
scire facias is grantable on motion after notice without the
issuance of a writ of scire facias.
The deletion of the former 1.7(e) was a matter of housecleaning.
That rule provided for the abolition of technical defensive pleadings,
such as rejoinders, rebutters and the like, which were already abolished
through the phrase in 1.7(a): "No other pleading shall be allowed . .. ."
The purpose of the new rule is simplification. The drafting of a
motion is better known to the practice than the drafting of a writ of
scire facias.' 5 Of course, a writ of scire facias is still obtainable."
II. RULE 1.20. CONSOLIDATION: SEPARATE TRIALS
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and
it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) Separate Trials. The, court in furtherance of con-
venience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, or of any separate issue or of any number
of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, or issues.
The former Florida rule 1.20 dealt with consolidation of causes. It
was taken from the 1931 Chancery Act § 20. Its language was not
readily applicable to situations arising under a rule encompassing both
13. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 59 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1952).
14. A motion is simply an application to the court for an order. Ordinarily, a motion
is not regarded as a responsive pleading. However, when the motion is viewed in terms
of its effect, rather than its form, it is apparent that sometimes a motion may perform the
same function as a responsive pleading.
15. The writ of scire facias has a history dating from the Act of Westminister, 1285,
13 Edw. 1, c. 18. Judge Hollands gave that history and its application in Florida special
attention in Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla. 1942).
The primary use of scire facias is to revive a judgment so that execution might issue.
29 FLA. JuR. Scire Facias §§ 4, 5 (1960).
16. FLA. R. Cir. P. 2.15, relating to scire facias, is still in effect.
1963]
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law and equity, especially when counterclaims and cross-claims were
involved.
The new 1.20(a) is identical to federal rule 42 (a). The power given
the court is purely discretionary and may be exercised sua sponte. The
test for determining if consolidation is proper is whether the actions
involve a common question of law or fact. Another requirement is that
the actions to be consolidated must be pending before the same court.
Generally, consolidation will be reasonable where the actions are of a
like nature, as when several negligence actions are brought arising out
of the same collision.' 7
Subsection (b) of Florida rule 1.20, relating to separate trials, is
newly added by the amendments. The court may order separate trials of
claims, cross-claims, or of any separate issues in furtherance of con-
venience or avoidance of prejudice. The trial court had this power
before it was placed in the rules. The only difference in Florida rule
1.20(b) and federal rule 42(b) is the reference in the latter to third
party claims."
III. RULE 1.32.11 WITNESSES, EXPERT, DEPOSITIONS
(1) The term "expert witness" as used herein applies
exclusively to a person duly and regularly engaged in the prac-
tice of his profession, who holds a professional degree from a
university or college and has had special professional training
and experience, or one possessed of special knowledge or skill in
respect of the subject upon which he is called to testify.
(2) The testimony of any expert or skilled witness may
be taken at any time before the trial of any civil cause in any
of the courts of this state, in equity or at common law, upon
reasonable notice, in the manner now provided for taking dep-
ositions under Rule 1.21 or Rule 1.22, notwithstanding the
residence of the witness. Provided, however, that the court may,
upon proper objection by opposing counsel pursuant to due
notice, disallow the taking of such deposition, and require the
attendance of such witness in person at the trial of the cause, if
the court finds that the personal appearance of such witness at
the trial shall be necessary to insure a fair and impartial trial.
Such objection shall be made to the court prior to the taking
of the deposition, otherwise the same may be used in evidence,
if otherwise admissible.
17. MOORE, MANUAL § 20.01[1], at 1443 (1962). The cited portion of Moore also
discusses other uses of consolidation.
17a. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure contain no provision equivalent to federal
rule 14 for third-party practice. Pan American Surety Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 99
So.2d 726 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
18. The provisions for depositions de bene esse, formally under rule 1.32, were abolished
since other rules are sufficient to enable depositions to be taken under the same circumstances.
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(3) An expert or skilled witness, whose deposition is
taken, shall be allowed a witness fee, in such reasonable amount
as the trial judge may determine, and the same shall be taxed
as costs.
(4) Nothing herein contained shall prevent the taking
of any deposition as otherwise provided by law.
The new rule 1.32 is a transposition of section 90.23 of the Florida
Statutes, with no change in substance. It provides for taking testimony
of expert witnesses, notwithstanding their residences.
Rule 1.21 provides for the taking of depositions and regulates their
use. By implication rule 1.32 carves out some exceptions to rule 1.21.
The former relates to the taking of depositions of an "expert," which
must be done pursuant to rule 1.21. But under 1.32 a party may object
to the mere taking of the deposition of an "expert" on the ground that
his personal appearance at trial is required to insure a fair and impartial
trial. The objection must be made before the deposition is taken. It
appears that if no objection is made to the taking, or if the objection is
overruled, the deposition may be used "if otherwise admissible," even
though the witness is available to testify in person. Since the adoption of
this rule, it is not a condition precedent to using the deposition for
the court to find "that the witness is at a greater distance than one
hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing or is out of the United
States . . ." as is necessary under rule 1.21(d)(3).
Section 90.23 of the Florida Statutes, from which the new rule
1.32 is taken, was probably in conflict with rule 1.21 regulating the taking
and also the use of depositions. However, by virtue of the fact that the
statute was placed in the rules, it is now presumed to be an exception
to, or limitation upon, the general provisions of rule 1.21. It will likely
be so construed.
IV. RULE 1.35. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
1. Introduction to the Problem of Termination of Actions in Florida
Before the recent amendments, rule 1.35 was substantially the
same as federal rule 41. However, the Florida rule contained the extra
words "however . . . nothing stated herein shall preclude a nonsuit
from being taken pursuant to any applicable statute." This phrase has
caused some confusion to bench and bar. It has been deleted from the
new rule 1.35. The effect of the deletion is not clear. Practitioners,
students and even judges"9 now wonder whether the right of non-suit
still exists, and if so, what its effects are.
19. "The Judges are hearing much argument as to whether the non-suit statute has
been repealed by negative implication . . . . there seems to be some argument about this."
Letter from Robert J. O'Toole, Chairman of the Civil- Section of the Court of Record
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Discussion shall first be made of the new rule 1.35 as it compares
with its federal counterpart, rule 41, forgetting for the moment the
non-suit complication in Florida. Thereafter, views will be offered on the
existence and possible application of non-suit in Florida, in light of the
omission of any reference to non-suit in the amended rule 1.35.
2. Analysis of Rule 1.35
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to provisions
hereof, except in actions in replevin or proceedings wherein
property has been seized or is in the custody of the court, an
action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court
(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary
judgment or decree, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared
in the action.
Without Prejudice, When. Unless otherwise stated in the
notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without preju-
dice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudica-
tion upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of this state an action based on or in-
cluding the same claim.
The first paragraph of rule 1.35 (a) (1) is the same as the language
in federal rule 41(a)(1), except that the words "except in actions in
replevin or proceedings wherein property has been seized or is in the
custody of the court" have been substituted for the words "Rule 23(c),
of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States" in the federal rule.
The second paragraph of the above quoted rule is the same as the
second or last sentence of federal rule 41(a)(1), except the words "any
court of this state" have been substituted for the words "any court of
the United States or of any state" in the federal rule.
It will be noted that two types of voluntary dismissal are mentioned
in the first paragraph: (i) notice dismissal and (ii) dismissal by stipula-
tion. The second paragraph contains the so-called two-dismissal rule:
The second notice of dismissal of the same claim operates as an
adjudication upon the merits."
Judges' Association of Florida, to E. Snow Martin, Chairman of the Civil Procedure Sec-
tion of the Florida Bar Association, January 16, 1963, published in a Memorandum From
Marshall R. Cassedy, Executive Director of the Florida Bar Association, to The Florida
Bar's Committee on Civil Procedure.
20. Unless otherwise stated in a stipulation of dismissal, the dismissal is without preju-
dice. Successive dismissals by stipulation of the parties, expressly stated to be without
prejudice, have been held not to bar a further action. Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co.,
48 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). There is a question whether a notice dismissal following
a dismissal by stipulation would bar another action. It would seem that the rule should
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(2) By Order of Court; If Counterclaim. Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save
upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been served by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against de-
fendant's objections unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court.
21
Without Prejudice. Unless otherwise specified in the order,
a dismissal under the foregoing paragraph is without prejudice.
The first paragraph of rule 1.35(a) (2) is the same as the language
in federal rule 41(a)( 2 ),21a except that the word "served" has been
substituted for the word "pleaded" in the federal rule. The second
paragraph of the above quoted rule is the same as the third or last
sentence of federal rule 41(a)(2), except that the words "the fore-
going paragraph" have been substituted for the words "this paragraph"
in the federal rule. All of federal rule 41(a)(2) is in one paragraph,
whereas the Florida rule 1.35(a)(2) is divided into two paragraphs.
Where dismissal may not be effected under rule 1.35(a)(1), a
plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss only upon order of the court pursuant
to rule 1.35(a)(2). It is now well settled under the federal rule that
the granting of this motion is within the court's discretion, and not a
matter of right.'
apply only where the dismissal is by notice in both actions. However the language of the
rule is susceptible to varying constructions, since it states that "Unless otherwise stated
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dimissal operates as an adjudication on the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
-has once dismissed . . . an action." MOORE, MANUAL § 19.07[2] (1962).
21. Problems arise in cases wherein multidefendants are being sued and the plaintiff
wishes to dismiss the action as to some but not all of the defendants, or wherein one or
more of the defendants has answered and the plaintiff is now precluded from using notice
dismissal under the rule. For a discussion in this area see Massey, Civil Procedure, Fifth
Survey of Florida Law, Part Two, 16 U. MIAmi L. REv. 591, 619 (1962).
21a. FED. R. Cwv. P. 41(a) (2) is as follows:
By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If
a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him
of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph is without prejudice.
22. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 9 41.05, at 1019 (2d ed. 1951). One case, Bolton v.
General Motors Corp., 180 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1950), held that a plaintiff has an absolute
right to dismissal, restricted only by the requirement that it be upon order of the court
and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. Moore commented that the
holding misconstrued the rule. 5 MOORE, op. cit. supra at 1019. The case was overruled by
Grivas v. Parmalee Transp. Co., 207 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913
(1954).
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(b) Involuntary Dismissal. For failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court,
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him.
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evi-
dence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence
in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by the court
without a jury the court as trier of the facts may then determine
them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline
to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
With Prejudice. Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under the foregoing paragraph,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue or for the lack of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
The major distinction between Florida rule 1.35(b) and federal
rule 41 (b)22 a concerns the res judicata or "upon the merits" effect of
dismissals under the respective rules.23 The entire subsection (b) of
federal rule 41 is in one paragraph, whereas the Florida counterpart is
in three paragraphs. Two differences between the last sentence of the
federal fule and the last paragraph of the Florida rule are significant.
(1) In the latter, the words "under the foregoing paragraph" have been
substituted for the words "under this subdivision" of the federal rule.
(2) The words of the federal rule "and any dismissal not provided for
in this rule" have been deleted in the Florida rule. These changes in the
Florida rule make a great difference in the operation of the rules.
The last paragraph of 1.35(b) limits the res judicata effect of
22a. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) is as follows:
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion
is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The Court as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline
to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as pro-
vided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies,
a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack
of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
23. Another distinction between Florida rule 1.35(b) and federal rule 41(b) lies in
the fact that the latter was recently amended to provide that the motion for dismissal at
the close of the plaintiff's evidence shall apply only to non-jury cases. See Report of
Proposed Amendments to Certain Rules oj Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, Submitted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 1962, Advisory
Committee's Note following Rule 41.
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involuntary dismissals to those which arise under the second (or "fore-
going") paragraph, unless otherwise specified in the order of dismissal.
Thus, any involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute, or to comply
with the rules or a court order, is not automatically with prejudice. The
amended last paragraph of 1.35(b) removes the rules as a basis for the
res judicata effect of dismissals in these areas, and substantive law may
now be freely applied. Decisional law will govern whether dismissals
referred to in the first paragraph of rule 1.35(b), and involuntary dis-
missals not provided for in this rule, are with prejudice. A review of
decisions made before the rule was amended will be helpful at this point.
The case of Yinger v. Kasow"4 held that a dismissal for failure to
prosecute did not constitute an adjudication on the merits. Rule 1.35(b)
before the amendment stated that "any dismissal not provided for in
this rule," (dismissal for failure to prosecute was not so provided)
operated as an adjudication on the merits, unless otherwise specified in
the order. The amendment has removed any question of conflict be-
tween the Yinger decision and the language of the rule. The paragraphing
and wording of the new rule conforms to the Yinger decision, and hence-
forth, Yinger will govern. A dismissal for failure to prosecute will not be
upon the merits, unless otherwise ordered. This result is opposed to the
federal view. The federal courts bar the bringing of a subsequent action
when the initial action was dismissed for failure to prosecute and the
order of dismissal did not specify that it was without prejudice.2 5 How-
ever, the difference results from the fact that all the types of involuntary
dismissals, including dismissal for failure to prosecute, are incorporated
in the phrase in the federal rule that "a dismissal under this subdivision"
shall be without prejudice. The Florida rule is more restrictive in scope
than the federal rule. Only those dismissals under the second paragraph
of the Florida rule are with prejudice.
The res judicata effect of involuntary dismissal for failure to
comply with a court order has been decided in Hinchee v. Fisher.2"
That type of dismissal was held to be upon the merits. The court's
authority was the pre-amendment clause in rule 1.35(b) that "unless
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision . . . shall operate as an adjudication upon the merits."
Failure to comply with a court order was at that time "under this sub-
division." The authority of the rule as a basis for Hinchee has been
removed by the amendment of rule 1.35(b), which leaves the Florida
24. 123 So.2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
25. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 41.11[2], at 1039 (2d ed. 1951).
26. 93 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1957). The assignor of a lease filed the first action against the
assignees. The action was dismissed for failure of the assignors to pay into registry of
court a sum of money which the court had required in an order. The second action, an
identical claim between the same parties, was barred.
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courts free to apply the substantive or decisional law. Where a reasonable
excuse is offered for failure to comply with an order, the court should,
in the exercise of its discretion, either refuse to dismiss or provide in its
order of dismissal that it does not constitute an adjudication upon the
merits.27
The involuntary dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
cause of action2" is not provided for in rule 1.35. Whether that type of
dismissal is upon the merits has caused problems in Florida. The position
of the Restatement of Judgments is:
Even though the judgment for the defendant is based upon
the failure of the plaintiff to state in his complaint facts suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action, the plaintiff is not neces-
sarily precluded thereby from maintaining an action on his
original cause of action. If his complaint in the later action
contains further allegations, the omission of which made the
complaint in the first action demurrable, the judgment in the
first action is not a bar to the second action.29
The rationale of Kautzmann v. James,"° a 1953 Florida Supreme
Court case, harmonizes with the Restatement. However, in Hammac v.
Windham"' the district court rejected the reasoning of the Kautzmann
case on the ground that the supreme court did not consider rule 1.35(b)
in reaching its conclusion. In Hammac the plaintiff failed in the first
action to allege facts sufficient to establish liability for gross negligence
under the guest statute. The complaint was dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. In the second action, even though the complaint
alleged additional facts sufficient to state a cause of action for gross
negligence, the defendant was granted summary judgment on his plea of
res judicata. The rationale was that rule 1.35(b) provided that unless
the court in its order of dismissal otherwise specifies, "any dismissal not
provided in this rule" shall operate as an adjudication upon the merits.3 2
Since the quoted words have been deleted in the amended rule
1.35(b), the rule as a basis for the holding in situations similar to
Hammac has been removed. Florida courts are now free to return to
the substantive decisional law, as expressed in the Restatement.
33
27. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 41.12, at 1040 (2d ed. 1951).
28. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.11(b)(6).
29. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 50, comment c (1942).
30. 66 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1953).
31. 119 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 122 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1960), 16 U. MIAM[I
L. REV. 621, 622 (1962).
32. Id. at 825.
33. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 50, comment c (1942). For other Florida cases on
this point see Bricklayers, Masons, Plasterers Union v. Acme Tile & Terrazzo Co., 112
So.2d 43 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959) ; In re Pellicer's Estate, 118 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960);
Capers v. Lee, 91 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1956). A recent clear statement of this point of law in
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In determining whether dismissal. for failure to state a cause of
action is res judicata or not, it is helpful to realize that an adjudication
upon the merits of a complaint is not necessarily an adjudication upon
the merits of a cause of action. In federal practice, the cardinal principle
is that if the complaint in the second action contains allegations which
rectify a material deficiency of the complaint in the first action, the
second action is not precluded.'
3. Status of Non-Suit
Having noted the present differences in the federal and Florida rules
for dismissal of actions, we shall direct our attention to the problem of
non-suit as it relates to the amended Florida rule 1.35.
At common law a plaintiff could abandon his case at any time before
the jury returned a verdict. The non-suit statute in Florida"3 limited the
time at which the plaintiff could elect a non-suit to the time before the
jury retired from the bar. A dismissal by reason of non-suit is always
voluntary, even though by inadvertence the judiciary may have referred
to non-suits as compulsory or involuntary. Under Florida practice,
there is no compulsory non-suit; however, there may be coercive cir-
cumstances inducing the non-suit dismissal. With the exception of the
statutory limitation upon the time of electing a non-suit dismissal, the
right was at one time construed by the courts as absolute. 6 However,
later decisions qualified and restricted the right.37 Whether the right
Florida was made by Mr. Chief Judge Carroll in Rice v. White, 147 So.2d 204, 207 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1962):
Under our practice a motion to dismiss a complaint on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action is addressed exclusively to the allegations of the complaint,
the well-pleaded allegations being assumed to be true for the sole purpose of
determining the validity of the motion. In other words, the court determines
whether the plaintiff, if he later proves the allegations of his complaint, would
thereby establish a cause of action against the defendant. The dismissal of a
complaint on such a motion merely means that the plaintiff has failed to include
in the allegations of his complaint all of the elements essential to his recovery
in a cognizable cause of action. Such a dismissal cannot be adjudication on the
merits because no evidence on the merits has been produced and, even if it were,
the evidence could not properly be considered in ruling on the motion to dismiss.
See Rules 1.8(b) and 1.11(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A.
34. For federal cases on point under the federal rules see Brazier v. Great AtI. & Pac.
Tea Co., 256 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Estevez v. Nabers, 219 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1955);
Curacao Trading Co. v. William Stake & Co., 61 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Russo v.
Sofia Bros., 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 12b.35, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
35. FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1961): "No plaintiff shall take a non-suit on trial unless he
do so before the jury retire from the bar." Another Florida Statute, § 59.05, provides for
appeal from an order granting a non-suit.
36. "In this state it is held that the right to take a nonsuit is only abridged by the
statute which limits the taking of a nonsuit to any time before the jury retires from the
bar." Pitt v. Abrams, 103 Fla. 1022, 1024, 139 So. 152, 153 (1931).
37. "The history of recent years has been that of a continuing limitation upon the
non-suit as known to the Common Law." Johns v. Puca, 143 So.2d 568, 570 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1962), cert. denied, 147 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1963). See, e.g., Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 139 Fla. 328, 190 So. 533 (1939) (lower court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion
for non-suit dismissal after the court had announced, but not entered, a ruling adverse to
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was categorized as absolute or not, it is subject to amendment and
modification by the judicial process and by new rules of procedure.38
If the non-suit statute and the procedural right to which it refers are
in conflict with the rule, the former must yield to the rule, at least to the
extent that the statute conflicts with the rule.89
Rule 1.35(a)(1) provides for a voluntary dismissal as of right
(other than by stipulation) only if notice is filed before the defendant's
answer or motion for summary judgment. Thereafter the granting of a
plaintiff's motion for dismissal requires an order of the court under
1.35(a) (2), and as stated in Moore's Federal Practice in reference to
rule 41(a) (2): "The granting of the motion is within the court's dis-
cretion, and not a matter of right."4 An unrestricted right of non-suit
would allow a plaintiff to terminate the action without prejudice after
the defendant had served an answer or motion for summary judgment,
i.e., at trial. The conclusion follows that, as provided in 1.35(a) (2), the
plaintiff's control over the termination of the action ends after his
adversary has served an answer or motion for summary judgment.
Rule 1.35, as related to voluntary dismissals, should be construed
in pari materia with the rationale behind the common law right of non-
suit dismissal. This simply means that in each case where a plaintiff
seeks termination of the action at trial, the court should balance the
equities of the plaintiff's not being forced to prosecute against his
wishes and a defendant's right to have the case decided, once it has
reached the trial phase. Thus, the resolution lies, as solutions to difficult
legal problems often do, within the sound discretion of the trial court,41
as provided for under rule 1.35(a)(2).
plaintiff on demurrer); Crews v. Woods, 59 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1952) (lower court did not
err in denying plaintiff's motion for a non-suit dismissal made after the court had announced
its decision to grant defendant's motion for a summary judgment on the defense of statute
of limitations). The supreme court in Crews stated at 538: "There was, then, no absolute
right to a non-suit, and the lower court did not err in so holding." The holding in Johns
v. Puca, 143 So.2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), was that a plaintiff in a legal action may not
exercise the right to non-suit so as to effect the substantive right of a counterclaimant
to a trial of his cause.
38. See National Broadway Bank v. Lesley, 31 Fla. 56, 12 So. 525 (1893) ; West Coast
Fruit Co. v. Hackney, 98 Fla. 382, 123 So. 758 (1929).
39. "When a rule is adopted by the supreme court concerning practice and procedure,
and such rule conflicts with a statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision." FLA.
STAT. § 25.371 (1961).
"All rules, parts of rules, statutes or parts of statutes inconsistent with the amendments
hereby approved and adopted are hereby repealed." In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
139 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962).
"The rule was adopted by this court pursuant to Article V, Section 3, Florida Con-
stitution, F.S.A. It, therefore, superseded any legislative enactment governing practice and
procedure to the extent that the statute and the rule may be inconsistent." Jaworski v.
City of Opa-Locka, 149 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1963).
40. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 41.05, at 1019 (2d ed. 1951).
41. Senate Bill 118 was sponsored by the Circuit Judges' Association to repeal the
sections of the Florida Statutes relating to non-suits. The opinion of the Association was
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The federal pratice allows the plaintiff a dismissal when, in the
course of the suit, the court feels that the dismissal will not unduly prej-
udice the defendant; Florida has adopted a similar provision, and
Florida courts seem disposed to take a similar attitude.
42
V. RULE 1.38. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT DECREES OR ORDERS
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments,
decrees, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected be-
fore the record on appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with
leave of the appellate court.
The first part of rule 1.38, subsection (a), empowers the trial
court to correct clerical errors. The amended 1.38(a), for all practical
purposes, is the same as federal rule 60(a).
"Clerical mistakes" include only those errors or misprisions arising
from an accidental slip or omission, and not errors or mistakes in the
substance of what is decided by the judgment or order. 3 In the
interest of justice, and to the end that the record reflect the actual
intention of the court and the parties, relief from these technical errors
should be freely granted. It matters not whether the mistake was made
by the court, clerk, or a party.
44
Although clerical errors may be corrected "at any time," the
pendency of an appeal affects the procedure for correction. Absent an
appeal, the trial court at any time may sua sponte, or on motion by a
that the trial judge could handle the situation more equitably under the voluntary dismissal
rule, rule 1.35 (a). The bill, which was defeated, was entitled "An Act relating to non-suits;
repealing Section 54.09, Florida Statutes, relating to time for non-suits; and repealing
Section 59.05, Florida Statutes, providing for appeal from order of non-suits." It was
introduced in April 1959. See Note, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 105, 122 (1960).
42. The case of Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 139 Fla. 328, 190 So. 533
(1939) (see note 37 supra), was decided before the adoption of rule 1.35(a), but Crews
v. Woods, 59 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1952), was decided after the adoption of the rule known as
rule 35, and now known as rule 1.35. In Johns v. Puca, 143 So.2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962)
it was held error to dismiss a compulsory counterclaim on plaintiff's motion at trial after
plaintiff had elected to take a non-suit dismissal of his claim, The authority for that hold-
ing was the provision in 1.35(a) (2) that if a counterclaim has been served by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action may not be
dismissed against defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication.
43. 30 F.S.A., Rule 1.38, Authors' Comment at 934 (1956).
44. This is true under the federal rules. 6 MoonE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 60.06, at 4042
(2d ed. 1953). However, a recent Florida case indicates that the mistake involved must
be the court's mistake, not an omission of a party. See State v. Gooding, 149 So.2d 55
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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party after such notice as the court may require,45 correct the mistake.
Regarding the effect of appeal, the Florida rule before amendment pro-
vided that errors could be corrected before the appeal is entered. The
rule now provides for correction before the record on appeal is
docketed in the appellate court. Therefore, in Florida, as in the federal
courts, the taking of an appeal does not divest the trial court of the
power to make corrections of a clerical nature. Before the record on
appeal is docketed, the procedure for correction is the same as if no
appeal were pending. After the record is docketed in the appellate court,
and while the appeal is pending, leave of the appellate court should
be obtained before correction by the trial court.4"
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, decree, order, or pro-
ceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial or rehearing; (3) fraud (whether here-
tofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment or
decree is void; (5) the judgment or decree has been satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged, or a prior judgment or decreee upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have
prospective application. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more
than one year after judgment, decree, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or decree or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judg-
ment, decree, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment
or decree for fraud upon the court.
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills
of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abol-
ished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment or decree shall be b motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.4"
45. Where the error is not apparent on the face of the record, and evidence must be
heard to ascertain whether there is in fact a clerical error, then the parties should be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f1 60.07, at 4052 (2d
ed. 1953).
46. 6 id. ff 60.08[2]. For an opinion as to whether errors can be corrected by the trial
court alter an appeal is considered, see 6 id. 1 60.08[3].
47. This subsection is in two paragraphs, whereas its federal counterpart, rule 60(b),
is in one. The substance is the same as the federal rule, except for the insertion in the
Florida rule of the words "decree" and "or decree" following the word "judgment," the
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This is a rule of procedure or practice" properly within the scope
of the supreme court's rule-making power. It abolished the use of the
ancillary writs of coram nobis and audita querela as legal remedies and
bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review in equity.' The
rule is intended to provide that the jurisdiction of the court under the
former procedure may now be invoked by a timely motion. The rule
was not intended to diminish the substantive remedial law but only to
provide that certain remedies may be applied for by motion.4" Of course
the court may not, by rule, abridge or abolish substantive remedial
rights, but it may regulate the manner, mode, means and methods of
invoking the court's jurisdiction in seeking remedies. ° A rule does
not lack validity because it deals with substantive matters. All rules of
civil procedure, except the most formal, deal with substantial matters of
procedure to the end that substantive rights may be speedily and justly
adjudicated. Giving relief from a judgment because it is a product of
the reasons listed in 1.38(b) is part and parcel of the procedural means
of procuring adjudication of substantive rights."
The purpose of rule 1.38(b) was to incorporate the substance of
common law and equitable ancillary remedies for the purpose of relief
from judgments.
1. Analysis of Rule 1.38(b)
(1) The first reasons listed for applying for relief from a final
judgment, order, decree or proceeding are mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect. Since the historical basis and foundation of
clause (1) of the Florida rule are the same as clause (1) of federal
rule 60(b), their scope will likely coincide.
Our rule 2.8 permits the correction of judicial errors on motions for
rehearing or new trial in actions at law, and rule 3.16 permits the cor-
rection of judicial errors on rehearing in suits in equity when a timely
motion or petition is made. After relief under these rules is exhausted
insertion of the words "or rehearing" in clause (2), the deletion of clause (6) reading
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" and the deletion
of the clause "or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided
in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655."
48. As to what is procedure or practice, see State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960),
15 U. MIAmi L. REv. 105 (1960).
49. For the scope of the substantive remedial law under coram nobis, audita querela,
and bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review, see 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
I 60.13-.15, at 33-72 (2d ed. 1955).
50. See State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
51. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 60.04[31, at 4037-39 (2d ed. 1953). However, as
Moore points out: "It is true that the principles of the ancillary remedies that were avail-
able only for relief from judgments at law, and the principles of the ancillary remedies that
were available only for relief from decrees in equity, have now been made available by
amended rule 60(b) [like Florida rule 1.38(b)] . . . irrespective of whether the judgment
was rendered in an action which was formerly one at 'law' or 'equity'." 6 -MOORE, op. cit.
supra at 4039.
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and the time for appeal has commenced to run, may the trial court
correct its judicial errors on the basis of a different rule of law or
change in a rule of law by a later decision? Or may the error of law be
corrected only on appeal? Moore is of the opinion that relief from
judicial error by the trial court ought to be permitted at any time be-
fore the time for appeal has expired, but he has doubts that his position
will be sustained in the construction of 60(b)(1). Moore's position is
as follows:
Does this extension of 60(b) (1) [like Florida Rule
1.38(b)(1)] authorize relief from a substantive error of law
by the court? If the Rule can be taken at its face value,
then the answer is probably in the affirmative, although the
matter is certainly not free from doubt.52
Federal rule 60(b) provides that the trial court may not extend
the time for taking an appeal under rule 73(a) and (g). Moore reasons
that to allow such corrections of substantive errors of law under 60
(b)(1) would indirectly extend the appeal time. 8 However, he then
states:
On the other hand, why should not the trial court have the
power to correct its own judicial error under 60(b)(1) [like
Fla. Rule 1.38(b)(1)] within a reasonable time-which as
we subsequently pointed out, should not exceed the time for
appeal-and thus avoid the inconvenience and expense of an
appeal by the party which the trial court is now convinced
should prevail?54
To satisfy the principle of finality and yet obtain the same flexibility
Moore suggests that:
A possible course of action that would seem, however, to
satisfy the conflicting principles of finality and flexibility dis-
cussed above, and also to be safe is this. Take an appeal within
proper time and also, within appeal time, move the district
court for relief; and then ask the appellate court to authorize
the district court to proceed and determine the motion. 5
(2) The second reason for applying for relief from a final judg-
ment, order, decree or proceeding is "newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial or rehearing." Newly discovered evidence is also a ground for a
motion for new trial under rule 2.8, but to be timely, that motion must
52. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 60.22[3], at 236 (2d ed. 1955).
53. Florida rule 1.6(b), similar to federal rule 6(b), provides that the court may not
"extend the time for making a motion for new trial, for taking an appeal, or for making
a motion for directed verdict."
54. 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 237.
55. Id. at 238.
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be served not later than ten days after the rendition of verdict or the
entry of summary judgment. If the evidence is not, or by due diligence
could not have been, discovered within time to move for a new trial
under 2.8(b), then relief may be sought under rule 1.38(b). Rule 2.8(g)
specifically provides that "this rule does not affect the remedies defined
in Rule 1.38(b)."
If any real distinction can be drawn between the principles governing
the type of evidence warranting relief under 2.8 and that warranting
relief under 1.38(b)(2), the difference is one of degree; under 1.38
(b)(2) a somewhat stronger showing may be required since it permits
a more belated attack upon the finality of the judgment. The evidence
"must be of such a material and controlling nature as would probably
induce a different conclusion, and not be merely cumulative."56
(3) The third reason for motioning under 1.38(b) is "fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresenta-
tion, or other misconduct of an adverse party." This clause is a recog-
nition of the inherent power of the court to protect itself against fraud.
The last sentence of the rule provides: "This rule does not limit the power
of the court . .. to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the
court."
"Fraud upon the court" may be established by an independent
action, by motion or otherwise. The exercise of the power is not
dependent on any particular procedural steps being taken to establish
it. The court may act sua sponte. It is only necessary that fraud,
misrepresentation or misconduct be established; however, the lapse of
time may dictate that the matter be left at rest.
(4) The fourth reason for applying for relief under 1.38(b) is
that the judgment or decree is void. It is important to understand the
ramifications of a void judgment. It creates no binding duty upon the
the parties; it is legally ineffective. 57 A party who attacks a judgment or
decree as void need show no meritorious claim or other equities on his
behalf; he need only establish that the judgment is void. He is entitled
to have it treated for what it is; a legal nullity. Clause (4) of rule 1.38
(b) is a recognition that a trial court has the power to grant relief, on
motion, from a void judgment or decree which it rendered. Relief from
a void judgment or decree may also be obtained in the following ways:
under rule 2.8, providing for amendments of judgments, if the motion
is made within ten days after rendition; by an independent action in
equity to enjoin its enforcement; or by collateral attack in any pro-
56. 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACnCE g 60.23 [4], at 242, 243 (2d ed. 1955).
57. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); MacDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S.
90 (1917).
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ceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment or decree is in
issue.58
(5) This clause constitutes a statement of three situations wherein
relief from a final judgment, decree or order is justifiable: first, where
the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released or discharged; second,
where a prior judgment or decree upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated; and third, where it is no longer equitable
that the judgment or decree should have prospective application.
Under the first ground recognized in clause (5) a motion is
authorized to secure an adjudication of the fact of compliance with a
judgment or decree of the court. A motion may also secure adjudication
of the fact that certain circumstances have occurred which make com-
pliance unnecessary, such as the judgment being discharged in bank-
ruptcy.
Under the second ground in clause (5) relief from a final judgment,
decree or order may be obtained from the trial court because a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated.
A change in the judicial view of applicable law after a final judgment is
not a sufficient basis for vacating that judgment if it was entered before
announcement of the change."
Where a decision on which a final judgment, order or decree is based
on appeal, 1.38(b)(5) is pertinent even though no appeal was taken
from the judgment from which relief is sought."0
The third ground under clause (5) applies chiefly to continuing
injunctions, but it encompasses any final judgment which has prospective
application. The critical issues determining relief are whether the
judgment has prospective application and whether it is no longer
equitable that the judgment have prospective application. With respect
to this motion, appropriate relief is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, whose action will not be disturbed on appeal if consistent
with accepted legal principles."'
58. Although there is no express recognition in federal rule 60(b) [which is similar
to Florida rule 1.38(b)] that collateral attack remains as a means for relief from a void
judgment, there is no merit to a conclusion that the rule affects that right under generally
accepted principles. Since the void judgment establishes no binding legal obligations, it
should have no res judicata effect when its validity is called into question by collateral
attack at any time. Laches of a party will not infuse life into a void judgment. 7 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.41[2] (2d ed. 1955).
59. Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1959); Collins v. City of Wichita,
254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958). But see Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960), wherein
the Court said: "[W]e need not go so far here as to decide that when an appeal has been
abandoned or not taken because of a clearly applicable adverse rule of law, relief under
Rule 60(b) is inflexibly to be withheld when there has later been a clear and authoritative
change in governing law."
60. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fr 60.26[3], at 282 (2d ed. 1955).
61. MOORE, MANUAL § 26.08, at 1920 (1962).
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Florida rule 1.38(b) omits clause (6) of the federal rule 60(b).
That clause reads: "any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment." Under the federal rule, the residual clause opens the
reservoir of the court's power to grant relief on a timely motion which
fulfills the following qualifications: first, the reason is one not stated in
clauses (1)-(5), and second, the reason urged justifies relief. It is not
an unbridled discretionary power to grant relief for any reason. Relief
under clause (6) of the federal rule must be for reasons justifying
relief under the substantive law, the reasons must be other than those
within clauses (1)-(5) and the motion must be timely.
Clauses (1) through (5) state the traditional or common grounds for
relief from final judgments or decrees. Clause (6) was only added in the
federal rule to provide for relief by motion in the event some recognized
ground for relief had been overlooked. As to its omission in the Florida
rule, it is suggested that the clause is not actually needed; yet some
situation may arise in which it could be used. If clause (6) of the
federal rule is amended by inserting the words "under the substantive
law," to make it read: "any other reason under the substantive law
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or decree," the
clause may be more acceptable, and less misleading.
As the rules in Florida now stand, relief which might fall under
clause (6) of the federal rule62 would be cause for an independent
action. The Florida rule abolishes the use of ancillary writs, but a
substantive remedial right can be claimed through an independent action,
begun by filing a compliant sounding in coram nobis or similarly.
2. Timeliness of Motion Under 1.38(b)
The rule provides that: "The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one
year after judgment, decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken."
This sentence requires all motions for relief under 1.38(b) to be made
within a "reasonable time." The "not more than one year" clause, which
is applicable only to clauses (1), (2) and (3)," is not a grant of one
62. As to what constitutes grounds for relief under clause (6) of the federal rule, Moore
states: "[T]o the extent that precedent dealing with these old remedies [coram' nobis,
etc.] would warrant relief in a situation not covered by clauses (1)-(5), then that precedent
is persuasive for the grant of relief under residual clause (6). If, however, the precedent is
against relief or no precedent under the old rmedies can be found, then that is not con-
clusive that relief should not be granted under clause (6)." 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
r 60.27[1], at 294 (2d ed. 1955).
63. Where a motion is timely, under the principles mentioned, it will usually suffice
to determine whether the reason urged is such as to justify relief, without determining
which specific clause of 1.38(b) covers the reason. But if the motion is made more than
one year after the judgment was entered, then it is necessary to determine whether the
reason is within clause (1), (2) or (3), for if it is, the maximum time limit of one year
applicable to those clauses cannot be circumvented. See 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 62,
at 309.
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year, but is rather a limitation when relief is sought by motion. Circum-
stances may require action earlier than the expiration of the "one
year," when relief is sought under those clauses. What is a "reasonable
time" must be determined according to the facts and circumstances of
each case.
With respect to clause (4), the reasonable time limtitation may
generally mean no time limit at all,'" because the theory underlying the
concept of a void judgment is that it is a legal nullity and may be
vacated by the court at any time. 5
What constitutes a timely motion under clause (5) should be
determined in light of all the circumstances of the case. Due to the
nature of the rationale underlying that clause, the "reasonable time"
limitation should be applied to the end that substantial justice be done.
This means that the movant should be given ample time under all
the circumstances to make his motion; but if he has not acted with
reasonable diligence, his motion may properly be denied.6
3. Independent Actions
Rule 1.38(b), like federal rule 60(b), provides that "this rule does
not limit the power of the court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from any judgment, decree, order or proceedings."
The purpose of the rule was to provide a motion procedure for the
ancillary common law and equitable remedies. The purpose of the
saving clause was to make it clear that the rule does not limit the power
of the courts in a proper case to grant relief against a judgment in an
independent action.
The independent action to obtain relief from a judgment or decree
is in personam against the party holding it, never against the court
rendering the judgment or decree. The usual ground is fraud, but
accident and mistake are also grounds for relief in an independent action.
Even though relief might have been obtained by a timely motion under
clauses (1), (2) or (3) of rule 1.38(b), the time of one year may have
elapsed and resort to an independent action may, under some circum-
stances, be appropriate.
4. Essentials and Effect of Motion
Rule 1.7(b), concerning motions, requires that an application to
the court for an order shall be by motion which "shall state with partic-
ularity the grounds therefor." The movant, under 1.38(b), should set
64. However, there may be exceptional situations where diligence would be required
on the part of the movant. See Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949).
65. See United States v. Sotis, 131 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1942).
66. 7 MooRE, FED ERAL PRAcrc f 60.26[1], at 275 (2d ed. 1955).
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forth matters with such particularity as to show he is entitled to the
relief sought. He should also show that the motion is timely.
Unlike a motion for new trial in actions at law, or a petition for
rehearing in equity, a motion under 1.38(b) does not affect the finality of
the judgment. Neither does that motion toll the time for appeal. The
motion is ancillary to the action wherein the final judgment or decree
was rendered, similar to the remedies of coram nobis and audita querela
in law actions and bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review
in equitable actions.
5. Appeals under Rule 1.38(b)
An order denying a motion for relief from a final judgment or decree
under 1.38 (b) is final and appealable, However, such an appeal does not
bring up for review the final judgment or decree from which relief was
sought.
The general tests of finality apply to an order granting relief from
a final judgment or decree under 1.38(b). If the trial court fully
adjudicates the motion, it is appealable as a final judgment or decree.
But if the trial court sets aside the judgment and orders a new trial,
the order is interlocutory and not appealable as a final judgment,
although probably appealable by statute as an order granting a new
trial.
An appeal from a final judgment or decree does not extend the time
for seeking relief under 1.38(b); the trial court cannot grant a motion
made after an appeal, whether or not the motion is made before the
appeal is taken. The appeal deprives the lower court of jurisdiction to
do anything that would affect the appellate court's jurisdiction. Leave
of the appellate court must be obtained if the trial court is to grant such
a motion.
67
VI. RULE 2.8. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIALS; REHEARING;
AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENTS
(a) Jury and Non-Jury Cases. A new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or a part of the issues.
On a motion for a rehearing of a summary judgment or of
matters heard without a jury, the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimony and enter
a new judgment.
The first sentence of this Florida rule is applicable to jury and non-
jury trials. A new trial may be granted upon grounds that would
support that order in the absence of the rule. Some of the language is
67. Procedures enabling the trial court to act on a 1.38(b) motion after an appeal is
taken are found in 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 60.30[2], at 335 (2d ed. 1955).
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taken from federal rule 59(a), which was designed to apply to actions at
law and suits in equity.
The second sentence of the Florida rule operates to give judicial
sanction to motions for rehearing6" where judgments have been entered
on motions to dismiss addressed to the complaint, motions for judgment
on the pleadings, motions for summary judgment, motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or motions to dismiss made at trial, as
provided for by various rules. All these, including summary judgments,
are "matters heard without a jury." It is suggested that the second
sentence might well be amended by deleting the words "of a summary
judgment or" as surplusage. The second sentence would then read:
On a motion for a rehearing of matters heard without a jury,
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony and enter a new judgment.
This change would still provide for rehearing of summary judgments,
a need which resulted from judicial pronouncements in Weisberg v.
Per69 and Marans v. Stang.7° These decisions indicated that a trial
judge lacked jurisdiction over a case after the entry of summary final
judgment. "The only method for review after a summary final judgment
has been entered is by direct appeal to this Court as provided for by
the laws and rules governing appeals from a final judgment in common
law actions."71  However, after the supreme court promulgated the
amendment to rule 2.8(a), but before the amendment took effect, the
supreme court reconsidered the question of a trial court's power to order
rehearing of a summary judgment. Its decision was that a "judge could
disturb his own judgment inasmuch as he had discovered that he had
erred" and that he was not "stripped of his power over the judgment
because it was a summary one."72 The rationale was based upon "the
inherent power of a court to repair the injury it has occasioned."73
An important result of the provision in the rules for rehearing of
matters heard without a jury (including rehearing of a summary judg-
68. "[T]he proper function of a petition for rehearing is to present to the court some
point which it overlooked or failed to consider by reason whereof its judgment is erroneous."
Mann v. Etchells, 132 Fla. 409, 417, 182 So. 198, 201 (1938). See also Batteiger v. Batteiger,
109 So.2d 602, 603 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
69. 73 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1954). "This is a common law action and a petition for a
rehearing after summary final judgment is unknown and unheard of in such a proceeding."
Id. at 57.
70. 124 So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
71. Weisberg v. Perl, 73 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1954), citing Kent v. Marvin, 59 So.2d 791
(Fla. 1952).
72. Floyd v. State, 139 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1962).
73. Ibid. However, Mr. Justice Drew dissented in Floyd, stating: "I find no Florida
decision sustaining a judicial revisory power over final judgments broader than that re-
quired to declare void that which is by its nature a nullity, or to correct errors to make
the record speak the truth." Id. at 877.
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ment) is its effect upon appeal times. Florida Appellate Rule 1.3
provides: "Where there has been a timely and proper motion or
petition for a new trial, rehearing or reconsideration by the lower court,
the decision, judgment, order or decree [from which appeal is taken]
shall not be deemed rendered until such motion or petition is disposed
of." In Counne v. Saffan 4 the supreme court held that inasmuch as
there was no rule providing for an attack by petition for rehearing on
a summary judgment, the filing of one would not extend the time for
taking an appeal and the period would, therefore, be computed from the
date of the final judgment. Since there is now a rule providing for
rehearing of a summary judgment, and other matters heard without a
jury, the basis for the Saffan decision has been removed. The appeal
time will now begin with the disposition of a timely petition for re-
hearing of matters heard without a jury,75 or of a motion for a new trial.
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial, or a
motion for rehearing in matters heard without a jury or re-
hearing of any motion for judgment provided for by these
rules, shall be served not later than 10 days after the rendition
of verdict or the entry of a summary judgment.
The main difference between Florida rule 2.8(b) and its federal
counterpart is that federal rule 59(b) 71a requires that the motion be
served ten days after entry of the judgment, whereas the Florida rule
specifies ten days after rendition of verdict or the entry of a summary
judgment.
The reasons supporting a motion for relief from judgments, decrees
or orders under rule 1.38(b), if discovered within ten days after ren-
dition of a verdict or entry of a summary judgment, should be used
as grounds for a motion for a new trial, rehearing or amendment of
judgment under rule 2.8. Relief may be more readily granted under
2.8, since the attack occurs sooner after the judicial action subject to
complaint.
The motion for rehearing may be addressed to any judgment
rendered in "matters heard without a jury," which may be a judgment
not provided for by these rules.
Rule 2.8(b) limits the time for serving motions for rehearing "on
matters heard without a jury or rehearing of any motion for judgment
74. 87 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1956), 16 U. Mi miL. REV. 30 (1961).
75. Cf. Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1960). Rehearings after
final judgments are not looked upon with favor under the federal rules. But see Gainey v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 303 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1962). That opinion, rendered
by Judge Hastie, is more liberal than usual.
75a. FED. R. Crv. P. 59(b) is as follows:
Time for Motion: A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days
after the entry of the judgment.
1963]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVII
provided for by these rules," to "not later than 10 days after . . . the
entry of a summary judgment." The application of the ten day limi-
tation is clear if the court has entered a final judgment on motion for
a summary judgment. But what is the time limitation for serving
a motion for rehearing in the following situations: when judgment of
dismissal is entered on motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a cause of action; when cases are tried without a jury; when
judgment is entered on motion for judgment on the pleadings; when
judgment is entered on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict?
In these instances there has been neither "rendition of verdict" nor
"entry of a summary judgment" from which to limit the time for a
motion for rehearing. Yet it is clear that the intent of the rule is to
permit a rehearing relating to such judgments. The object of the rule
is to permit self-correction of any error and not to require an appeal
when the error might be corrected in the court where it was made. The
rule is ambiguous and should be construed in light of its intent and
purpose, not literally. The ten day limitation must be interpreted as
commencing after the entry of any judgment in matters heard without
a jury, or any judgment on a motion provided for by "these rules."
Under this liberal construction those motions when "timely served"
within ten days after judgment, will suspend the finality of judgments
and toll the running of appeal times. "[T]he office of all the Judges
is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief." 6
However, the ambiguity in 2.8(b) would be removed by deleting
the words "a summary" and substituting the word "such." The rule
would then clearly provide:
A motion for a new trial, or a motion for rehearing in matters
heard without a jury or rehearing of any motion for judgment
provided for by these rules, shall be served not later than 10
days after the rendition of verdict or the entry of such judgment.
What if a plaintiff, being satisfied with the verdict in a jury trial,
does not file a motion for a new trial, but his adversary files a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict? If the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict is rendered more than ten days after the verdict,
does the rule authorize the plaintiff to serve a motion for a new trial
not later than ten days after judgment notwithstanding the verdict?
The rule is subject to the affirmative construction that he may, and
such construction would make the rule, in that respect, conform, to
federal rule 59(b), which permits serving of motions for new trial
"not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." If a favorable
76. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584) (Coke).
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verdict is superseded by an adverse judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, then a motion for new trial should be in order on any ground
that would have been available had the verdict been adverse. The
rule is ambiguous on this point unless amended as suggested.
(c) Time for Serving Affidavits. When a motion for a
new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits, which period may
be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
This subsection is new in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and
is the same as rule 59(c) of the federal rules. It will likely be construed
similarly.77
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment, or within the time of ruling on a timely
motion for a rehearing of non-jury matters or a timely motion
for a new trial made by a party in actions tried by a jury, the
court of its own initiative may order a rehearing or a new trial
for any reason for which it might have granted a rehearing
or a new trial on motion of a party.
This subsection is an expansion of federal rule 59(d), which pro-
vides: "Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of
its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party."
The purpose of the ten-day limitation on the court's granting a
new trial on its own initiative was to give finality to the judgment which
had been entered, in the absence of a motion for new trial by a party.
If a party has served a timely motion for a new trial, the finality of the
judgment has been suspended and the court is free, up to the time of
ruling on the motion, to do what it might have done on its own initiative
within ten days after judgment.78
(e) When Motion for Unnecessary; Non-Jury Case.
Where an action has been tried by the court without a jury,
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment may be
raised on appeal by an assignment of error whether or not the
party raising the question has made any objection thereto in
the trial court, or made a motion for rehearing, new trial or
to alter or amend the judgment.
This rule is merely declaratory of what would be the law of judicial
review.
77. See 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 59.10 (2d ed. 1953).
78. For a discussion of this second phrase in rule 2.8(d) see Kaufman v. Sweet Et A]
Corp., 144 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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(f) Order Granting to Specify Grounds. In actions tried
by a jury every order granting a new trial shall specify the
particular and specific grounds therefor.
This rule is in substance the same as rule 2.6(d), which has been
transposed merely to place it in the proper category. It requires the
court to give reasons for granting a new trial in jury cases, whether on
motion of a party or on the court's own initiative. When a case is
tried without a jury and the judgment is set aside on rehearing, the
case is merely reopened for further testimony. This is not a new trial,
plenary in nature, but only a continuation of the same trial; no reasons
for the rehearing are required to be stated. For purposes of appeal, an
order granting a new trial without stating the grounds therefor has been
treated as a nullity.79
(g) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to
alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than
10 days after entry of the judgment, except that this rule does
not affect the remedies defined in Rule 1.38(b).
This rule is the same as federal rule 59(e)" ° except for the added
clause: "except that this rule- does not affect the remedies defined in
Rule 1.38(b)." This clause is not in the federal rule.
VII. RULE 3.13. INTERPLEADER
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as
defendants and required to interplead when their claims are
such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or
multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder
that the claim of the several claimants or the titles on which
their claims depend do not have a common origin or are not
identical but are adverse to and independent of one another, or
that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part
to any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar
liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim
or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and
do not in any Way limit the joinder of parties otherwise per-
mitted.81
The rule as to interpleader removes a number of technical limi-
tations which grew up under classical chancery practice. During its
evolution the following restrictions were placed upon the use of equi-
table interpleader: (1) The same thing, debt or duty must have been
79. Morton v. Staples, 141 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
80. See Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 303 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1962),
construing FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).




claimed by both or all the parties against whom the relief was demanded.
(2) All their adverse titles or claims must have been dependent upon
or derived from a common source. (3) The person seeking relief must
not have had nor claimed any interest in the subject matter. (4) The
plaintiff must have incurred no independent liability to either of the
claimants; he must be a mere stakeholder. 2 This was the strict bill
of interpleader. These restrictions were restated by the Florida Supreme
Court as "indispensable to successful maintenance or interpleader."'s
The second sentence of the new rule 3.13 removes the rigidity of
the previous exactions. This rule is intended to pixevent multiplicity of
actions and circuity of litigation, thus protecting the stakeholder.
CONCLUSION
It is evident from a. study of these latest amendments to the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure that the trend is to conform more and more
closely to the federal rules. In 1945 a petition of the Florida Bar Associ-
ation requested that the Florida Supreme Court substitute the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for our system 'of common law and equity
practice.84 In denying this application, the supreme court explained
that the federal rules were "still in the experimental stage and must be
amended and adjusted. to a system materially different from our State
system where nine tenths of the practice, must be done."85 As the federal
rules have begun to grow out of the experimental stage, Florida has
profited by adopting various rules from federal .practice and, procedure.
That the job of prescribing rules. of procedure is a continuing one is
illustrated by the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
just undergone changes as extensive as the Florida amendments we
have been discussing.
On the whole, the Florida Supreme Court is succeeding admirably
in the never-ending responsibility of, prescribing "procedure that will
make the administration of justice everything that the man of the
street has been taught to expect of it."86 But the responsibility does not
lie with the supreme court alone. The bar should, and quite often does,
respond with constructive criticisms of existing rules and proposals for
amendments'and revisions. The process may be slow and tedious, but
progress is constantly being made.
82. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 22.03, at 3005, 3006 (2d ed. 1948).
83. Paul v. Harold Davis, Inc., 155 Fla. 538, 541, 20 So.2d 795, 796 (1945). See also
Pan American Surety Co. v. Cooke, 130 So.2d 290 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), which cites the
Paul case with approval.
84. Petition of Fla. Bar Ass'n for the Adoption of Rules for Practice & Procedure,
155 Fla. 710, 21 So.2d 605 (1945).
85. Id. at 719, 21 So.2d at 609.
86. Id. at 716, 21 So.2d at 608.
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This article has concerned itself with rules by civil procedure;
however, a recent amendment to the appellate ruless" is worthy of
discussion.
APPELLATE RULE 3.5(c)
(c) Essentials. The assignments or cross assignments of
error shall designate identified judicial acts which should be
stated as they occurred; grounds for error need not be stated
in the assignment.
The first clause, "the assignments or cross assignments of error shall
designate identified judicial acts . . . ," is mandatory and means that
each assignment of error shall be addressed to a designated act of the
judge. The designation should be sufficient to identify the act. How-
ever, since the policy of the law of procedure is to advance the remedy
in order to secure a determination of the controversy, and not to avoid
the determination of the controversy without just cause, this provision
will likely receive a liberal construction. Nevertheless, the judicial act
complained of should be ascertainable from the assignment as it is
worded. The notice of appeal and other circumstances may aid in this
determination.
It is only judicial acts that may be the basis of assignments of
error. Jury verdicts and irregular conduct of the jury or attorneys are
not acts of the court or judge; however, they may be the grounds of
invoking judicial acts. Judicial acts may be acts of omission or com-
mission. It is essential that the judicial act complained of by the
assignment be established as true in fact by the record. Assignments
of error are not self-proving. They must be established by the record
on appeal and not by the brief or oral argument.
If a party is not aggrieved by an act of the court, there is no basis
for an assignment of error and likewise there is no basis for an appeal.
The want of an assignment of error is not jurisdictional, but it is ground
for the dismissal of an appeal because there is nothing for the appellate
court to decide, except possibly in trials de novo on appeal. Of course,
assignments of error are amendable.
The clause that assignments of error "should be stated as they
occurred" is directory. "Errors" should be stated as they occurred so
that the statement will impart some information concerning the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances to the appellate court. When the
error is designated as a certain order, judgment or decree of a given
date recorded at a page in a book, it is not stated as it occurred. If
the error was a judgment sustaining a motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of the complaint, the assignment should so recite. If it was a judgment
87. In re Florida Appellate Rules, 142 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1962).
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of dismissal after final hearing on the pleadings and the evidence, these
circumstances should be stated in the assignment, i.e., according to the
facts and circumstances "as they occurred." Of course, the facts and
circumstances as they occurred may be generally stated in the assign-
ments and then amplified for clarity in the brief.
The clause providing that "grounds for error need not be stated
in the assignment," dispenses with the necessity of making any con-
tention in the assignment as to why the judicial act complained of was
error. It reserves the statement and argument of the grounds of error
for presentation in the brief.
